Credit markets contribute to economic development when they allocate capital through secure and enforceable contracts. Surprisingly little is known, however, about what these markets looked like and how they functioned in the Dutch Republic. By analysing three archival collections from Amsterdam this article attempts to fill this lacuna. It documents a large and developed non-intermediated credit market that relied on standardised loan forms. These forms were cast in the correct legal terms, could be purchased across the city, and cost little. Where people's own networks did not suffice to mobilise funds, moreover, brokers stood ready to link demand and supply.
that these intermediaries did not play a similar role there.
６ Did other intermediaries, such as brokers, perhaps play a role then or did there, as was the case in rural Württemberg, exist a bustling non-intermediated credit market? ７ In other words, what did private credit markets in the Dutch Republic look like and how did they function? De Vries and Van der Woude claimed that a 'tangle of debt and credit linked the Republic's households'. Based on estimates of the real per capita money supply they also surmised that a low velocity of circulation during the eighteenth century resulted in 'cash balances so large as to suggest hoarding'. Connecting this to the functioning of credit markets they argued 'that financial intermediation left much to be desired'.
８ However, their reliance on cash holdings recorded in probate inventories likely overestimated hoarding, and thus underestimated financial activity, because sickness and imminent death may have raised people's preference for holding cash. The possibility that cash was simply held for unexpected expenses or opportunities should be considered as well. Rich investors keeping 2 to 4 percent of their wealth in cash does not seem excessive in this respect and they did not like to keep too much money laying idle either. provided a solution to a limited, richer part of society as securities typically had denominations of 1,000 guldens. １０ Despite Jonker's valuable contribution still little is known about the alternatives that these elites used and about how the rest of society contracted loans. This article analyses loan contracts that were used in Amsterdam from the seventeenth until at least the early nineteenth century to fill this lacuna. These contracts have survived in three archival collections: the ledger of two shopkeepers (1723-1725; 1797-1799), the Insolvency Chamber's archive (1737-1809), and the documents of a silk merchant (1692-1735). These unique collections make it possible to uncover transactions that usually remain hidden from sight. They show that standardisation of loan contracts in pre-printed forms and taxation by the government through the introduction of the stamp duty (klein zegel) in 1624 not only determined the physical appearance of loans recorded in writing, but also signal that the market for such loans was large and developed. Loan forms were cheap, could be purchased in well over a hundred bookshops across the city, and were used in all segments of society and the credit market. Loan forms were this successful because they were embedded in the legal system and because they were tailored to the needs of lenders and borrowers. Although the nature of these sources does not allow us to observe the work of intermediaries in detail, this article shows that pre-industrial financial markets without banks were nevertheless able to mobilise large amounts of credit. Additional contemporary sources demonstrate, moreover, that brokers stood ready to match demand and supply for whom this market did not suffice. This shows that the absence of banks from preindustrial societies did not impede credit markets from successfully mobilising large amounts of credit.
The article first discusses the stamp duty and reviews the implications it had on recording loans and then considers how the frequent use of credit in seventeenth-century Amsterdam led to the introduction of standardised loan forms. Next it discusses the sources, the types and appearance of loan forms, and the way in which these forms were used. The final sections address brokers' intermediation on credit markets and conclude.
10 Jonker, Merchants, bankers, and middlemen.
２
The stamp duty
The province of Holland introduced the stamp duty on 13 August 1624 because it needed revenues to field an army and prevent an expected Spanish invasion. Fears of such an invasion were not ungrounded as hostilities between the Republic and Spain had resumed after the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621). As real estate and consumption were already taxed extensively, Holland ventured into taxing transactions of which people wished to have written proof such as testaments, marriage contracts, leases, and loan contracts. The provincial government did so since it had noticed, or so it asserted, that many conflicts arose because of the documents that people drew up. It was therefore stipulated that henceforth documents would only be admissible in litigation when drawn on paper over which stamp duty had been paid. Since contracts were already permitted as proof in litigation before and no changes were made as regarding their content, the stamp duty really was nothing more than a means of increasing government revenues. It should not be precluded, however, that some lenders preferred stamped contracts over unstamped ones because they interpreted the stamp as a form of certification.
１１
The attempt to tax loans shows that already during the first half of the seventeenth century the credit market had become large enough to make taxation worthwhile. If the province of Holland wished to raise its revenues, however, it had to set incentives such that the stamp duty would not lead to tax evasion. This first of all meant that tax rates should not be too high. In 1638 rates were set at four stuivers (0.20 guldens) for obligations with a value from 200 to 600 guldens and eight stuivers (0.40 guldens) for larger ones. These rates were raised to six and twelve stuivers (0.30 and 0.60 guldens respectively) in 1665. In 1677 rates were doubled and 0-100 guldens (three stuivers or 0.15 guldens) and 100-200 guldens (six stuivers or 0.30 guldens) categories were introduced. In 1745 a larger than 2,000 guldens category (48 stuivers or 2.40 guldens) was added to the top of the spectrum as well. Finally, a new and more refined categorisation was put in place in 1795 when Holland was once more searching for additional revenues.
１２
A logistical operation was required to provide all the stamped paper to the public. The province provided towns with sheets of paper that each contained a stamp mentioning the year and tariff rate. Local town secretaries certified these sheets by adding their signature next to the stamp. The sheets were then sold for the rate on the stamp plus some surcharges. In 1754, for instance, the surcharge for the sheet of paper on which the stamp was printed amounted to eight penningen or 0.025 guldens.
１３
In addition to these modest rates (see Figure 1) , the province of Holland instituted relatively large fines for noncompliance. During the period under review here a fine of 100 guldens applied to borrowers who recognised a debt on unstamped paper. Lenders who accepted such a document would receive a fine of 50 guldens and the same applied to those who accepted the contract in any subsequent secondary transaction. Justice would only be served, moreover, once the appropriate tax was paid.
１４
Since fines were so much higher than fees many will have found it worthwhile to comply with stamp duty regulations. Noncompliance will have occurred most frequently among smaller loans because the stamp duty weighed relatively heavily on those. There, access to litigation probably was less of a concern too because legal expenses were large relative to the principal. Likewise, lenders who expected to be able to enforce (re)payment through informal mechanisms instead of the courts may also have complied less often. The stamp will thus have changed the physical appearance of many, but definitely not all, recorded loans. 
３ Standardisation
The emergence of standardised pre-printed forms constituted the second major modification in the appearance of loan contracts. Figure 4 was printed by this company.
trieved here was signed in 1660 and by the early eighteenth century they had become common enough for Le Moine de l'Espine to discuss them in his famous merchant manual. Silk merchant Simon Bevel, whose borrowing will be discussed in more detail below, used the forms of six different Amsterdam booksellers between 1700 and 1720.
１７
Loan forms were typically similar to A4 size and often they were A3-size sheets folded in half. They contained the text of a loan contract to which the contracting parties only had to add their names, the date, and the loan's size, interest rate, and term.
１８ Booksellers usually advertised for their businesses by including the name and location of their company, as well as its merchandise, in the header of loan forms. １９ Here they styled themselves in different ways, including book and paper seller, pen and paper seller, art and bookseller, printer, printer and paper seller, and printer and bookseller. Bookseller Dirk Schuurman explicitly advertised that he sold all kinds of stamped paper.
２０
The number of booksellers who sold loan forms is unknown, but forms that survived in the Insolvency Chamber may provide a lower-bound estimate. By linking company names in the headers with the years in the stamps it could be established when particular booksellers must have been active. The case of Jan Schalker, who owned a shop on the Lelie- gracht, may be used to illustrate the procedure. In this particular collection Schalker can be found as a seller of loan forms with stamps dated 1775-1776, 1778, 1781-1782, 1784-1787, 1789-1791, 1793-1797, and 1799. The intermittences obviously do not mean that Schalker did not sell forms in those years, but rather that there were no insolvencies in which his forms were involved. Given his prolonged activity as a seller of loan forms it is likely, however, that Schalker also sold them in 1783 and 1788, for example. It is therefore assumed that Schalker started selling loan forms in 1775 and stopped in 1799. Applying this method to the other forms yields a minimum of over fifty booksellers during the late 1780s. Given the particular nature of the source used for this analysis it is not unlikely that bookshops throughout Amsterdam sold loan forms. According to Le Moine de l'Espine loan forms could indeed be purchased from every bookseller.
２１ This would mean that the number of shops selling loan forms exceeded 150 throughout the period under review here.
２２
The geographical threshold to purchase loan forms was low. Many shops were located in the commercial district, but loan forms were also sold in other and poorer neighbourhoods. In the western part of town this included the Anjeliersgracht, Haarlemmerdijk, Laurierstraat, Lindengracht, Rozengracht, and Tweede Tuindwarsstraat. And in the eastern part of town this included the Geldersekade, Jodenbreestraat, Schippersgracht, Sint Antoniesbreestraat, Wittenburgergracht, and Zeedijk. The same applied with respect to costs. A newspaper advertisement in Leeuwarden, a town in the province of Frisia with around 15,000 inhabitants, offered them at a cost of only one stuiver (0.05 guldens).
２３ In Amsterdam, with its more vibrant economy and larger number of bookshops, prices surely will not have been higher. The wide availability of cheap and standardised loan forms They both recorded the deference of payment allowed to seafarers about to embark. These seafarers promised to pay upon their return in the Republic.
Third, a collection of 816 private loans signed between 1737 and 1809, most of which were made on forms, has survived as well in an uninventoried part of the Amsterdam archive.
２９ Notes on dozens of them provided a strong indication of why they have survived as a batch. On a bond signed 10 April 1796, for example, it was noted: 'The content of this plus interest received from the Lords Commissioners of the Insolvency Chamber of 25 ACA, Brants, inv.nrs. 1743, 1744A, 1744B. As these contracts were not checked against his business ledgers, it is not possible to say which share of his overall borrowing they represent. It is not unlikely, however, that they represented a major part of Bevel's external funding. The number of annual loans, for instance, increased as Bevel's career as silk merchant took off and diminished again during the last decade of his life. The number of annual loans was high (fourteen times ten or more per year), loans were often rolled over, and the loans represented large amounts of money (eleven times 100,000 guldens or more per year). 26 This is supported by the fact that the contracts are easy to read whereas contemporaries complained about Bevel's own handwriting. 
３２
The Insolvency Chamber was established in 1643 and insolvency cases were delegated to it by the aldermen. Two changes in insolvency regulations were responsible for the survival of this set of bonds. The new insolvency rules of 1777, the first revision after more than a century, stipulated that all possessions of the insolvent henceforth had to be handed over to the Insolvency Chamber. Previously the insolvent regained control over his possessions after reaching a settlement with his lenders and he had to make payments to them himself. Through the new regulations the Insolvency Chamber itself took responsibility as a trustee for making payments to the lenders on behalf of the insolvent. Bonds that could be linked to an insolvency case all entered the Insolvency Chamber after 1777. Quite similarly the Code de Commerce, introduced per 1 March 1811, fundamentally changed insolvency law and led to the dissolution of the Insolvency Chamber. This second event made that the latest bonds entered the Insolvency Chamber in 1810. It is therefore fairly certain that these new insolvency rules, and not another reason, were responsible for the formation of this remarkable collection.
３３
Combined these three collections shed light on the whole of Amsterdam's social ladder. Loans in the Insolvency Chamber collection ranged between as little as 20.25 guldens and as much as 25,000 guldens, but averaged 1,254 guldens with a median of 700 guldens. Although almost 72 percent of all loans were for 1,000 guldens or less, only four loans smaller Bempden and Elizabeth Tielens, one of the wealthiest people in the Republic and married to yet another burgomaster. Le Moine de l'Espine's merchant manual suggests that other merchants also widely used privately recorded loans.
３７

Figure 3. The basic loan form
Source: ACA, Schuldbekentenissen.
37 Kees Zandvliet, De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw. Kapitaal, macht, familie en levensstijl (Amsterdam 2006) 11-12. The differences between loans recorded in handwritten contracts and forms were modest. The average sizes were 8,220 and 7,007 guldens and median sizes were 6,000 and 6,250 guldens. Le Moine de l'Espine, Koophandel, 571-585.
５
The basic loan form
The forms available in the sources discussed above suggest that the basic form was for a borrower who offered a general mortgage ('myn Persoon en alle myne Goederen') as security for the loan (see Figure 3) . ３８ This was an informal loan that gave the lender a secondary claim on the borrower's possessions (as did notarised loans).
３９ In case of insolvency, holders of secondary claims divided what was left after the preferential claims had been paid out. ４０ Evidence in the insolvency files confirms that loan forms were treated accordingly. Loans and loan forms were thus defined and embedded in Amsterdam's legal structure. This is important because transactions would only be sustainable when they could be recorded in enforceable contracts. This basic contract seems to have functioned properly, but in one instance a borrower promised to sign a notarised deed when such would be demanded by the lender ('Ook verbinde mij desgerequireert wordende deese notariaal te passeren.'). This was presumably motivated by the fact that notarised deeds, contrary to privately recorded contracts, were considered authentic documents.
４１
On the form it could be specified whether the loan was received in cash ('contant' or 'courant') or in bank ('bank') money. The latter was only observed a few times because the artisans and traders that ended up in the Insolvency Chamber probably did not use the Wisselbank extensively. Barend Berckhoff, who received 10,000 bank guldens from Jan van Dilsen on 9 April 1790, was one of the exceptions. Simon Bevel, however, used forms on which 'bank money' was already pre-printed.
The basic form was flexible in two ways. First, the loan could be rolledover ('Prolongatie'). The revaluation that took place at this moment enabled lender and borrower to end a loan or to renew with or without changing loan terms.
４３ To some forms the parties added that rolling over would automatically take place unless lender and borrower informed each other about redemptions some months in advance. ４４ Jacoba de Clercq (lender) and Hendrik Smit (borrower) also added that annual instalments had to be made in case their loan would be rolled over. Only in few instances was the rolling over of a loan also explicitly recorded as such on the form. Second, the instrument was transferable because the borrower recognised a debt to his lender or the bearer of the form ('ofte Toonder deezes'). Only one such transaction could be identified with certainty, however.
４５
This transfer was made by Gerret van den Boll who had lent out 200 guldens on 4 March 1789 but sold this investment shortly afterwards. Boll noted on the form 'for me to bearer G. ter Veer' and already on 28 January and 19 May 1790 a Gerrit ter Veer signed for having received payments.
４６ It is not surprising, however, that there is little evidence of such transfers. The use of general mortgages suggests after all that lenders initially felt comfortable about their borrowers' ability to repay. Obtaining even a rough measure of a borrower's net wealth surely will have required a certain level of familiarity. The downside of this familiarity was that it reduced the potential for transfers because lenders would have found it
43 This is what Simon Bevel experienced with respect to the interest rate of his one-year loan of 1 March 1698. While initially set at 5 percent it was lowered to 4 percent in 1703 but increased again to 4.5 percent in 1706. This suggests that in this part of the market both lenders and borrowers had to conform to market conditions. 44 As did widow Nolte (leender) and Casper Hendrik Prante (borrower) on 9 February 1789: 'Den leender & den geltopnemer zullen malkander drie maanden van te voorren waarschouwen om het op te eijsen of af te doen.' 45 As the information on the forms is incomplete, it is also difficult to establish whether a 'real' transfer had taken place. Take, for instance, the 500 guldens that Joseph Assel borrowed on 2 June 1793 from Magtel van Berkum. In the margin of the form it was noted (later, it seems) that the form belonged to a Joannes Engelbertus Verlinden ('toebehorende aan'). difficult to credibly convey their private information about a borrower's creditworthiness to a third party. Screening, monitoring, and enforcing would all have been more difficult for such a third party. The existence of certain degrees of familiarity between lenders and borrowers is supported in quite some instances on forms in the Insolvency Chamber collection. In eighteen loans the relationship with the lender is explicitly given (e.g. 'my father') and on some thirty additional loans the family names of lender and borrower were the same. A further 135 can be identified if it is assumed that repeat transactions are a sign of familiarity.
４７
The Bevel loans also provide compelling evidence of the importance of such relationships. Egidius van den Bempden provided 22 loans during the period 1699-1725, the longest found for Bevel's lenders. Similar longterm relationship existed with many others, the most important being Elizabeth Tielens who provided most loans (27) of all his lenders. Elizabeth probably was acquainted with Bevel through her father, the silk merchant Michiel Tielens.
４８
Compared to other forms of paper wealth that were common in Amsterdam during (e.g. cashiers' notes, Holland bills, and East India Company shares) or after (e.g. paper money) the pre-industrial period, most of the private loans discussed in this article were thus not very liquid. They were not traded easily and their circulation was limited.
４９ Endorsing loans to increase tradability, as was common with bills of exchange, was no option because loans could be rolled over. Whereas terms of bills of exchange were fixed and fairly short, they could become fairly long for loans. This created time horizons beyond which the original lender, or those who 47 Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, Priceless markets follow a similar procedure for distinguishing between loans negotiated through networks and intermediaries. It should be noted that these close ties will also have made some lenders reluctant to demand repayment when their borrowers experienced financial difficulties. This is in line with the small settlement percentages found in the insolvency files, but these are consistent too with borrowers experiencing disastrous events. See Oldewelt, 'Amsterdamse faillissementen'. endorsed after him, were unwilling to vouch for the creditworthiness of the borrower (or each other).
５０
６
Offering additional security
Lenders unwilling to lose money due to contingencies faced by their borrowers demanded additional security. Booksellers consequently also offered forms with the basic text to which sections on collateral or pledges were added. The first variant of this form (see Figure 4 ) added a paragraph for handing over collateral ('Pand der minne'). Not only the collateral was specified, but several other arrangements were made too. First, the borrower paid the storage costs ('de Huur'), remained solely liable for everything that could happen to the goods, and could not access the goods prior to full repayment of the loan. ５１ Second, the contract included a margin call stipulation. This forced the borrower to post additional collateral in case prices decreased. ５２ Third, if the borrower did not honour the contract the lender was only held to a twenty-four hour warning period before he could sell or auction the goods ('24 uuren voor af 't zy mondeling of schriftelyk gewaarschouwd'). Surpluses, however, should be returned to the borrower whereas he remained liable for any deficits. A special type of collateralised loan form was designed for the use of securities.
５３ These forms were called Beleenings-Obligatiën en Renverzaalen (see Figure 5 ). This form must have been used quite frequently because of the large amounts of domestic and foreign securities issued in Amsterdam and the Republic. ５４ Contrary to the other forms this form treated rolling over as the default option. Lenders and borrowers had to inform each other a certain time in advance if they wished to cancel the loan. The remaining conditions were similar to the regular form, but the margin call stipulation allowed one to specify exactly the loan to value ratio of the collateral. Another variant of the basic form allowed the borrower to add a pledge to the contract (see Figure 6 ). Promises like this were not simply paper promises. F.W. Muller experienced this in 1789 when (s)he had to pay the 200 gulden loan borrowed by Jean Daniel Gradelle in 1782.
While these variant forms thus broadened the group of users it should be taken into account that people not always used them to complete such transactions. Some used the basic form and added themselves that a collateral had been handed over. This is, for instance, what Joannes van der Bergh did on 18 July 1792 when he borrowed 400 guldens from Jan van Bleijenberg's widow. 
Specific target groups
The foregoing forms did not suffice for all borrowers, however. For at least two of such groups, multiple borrowers and seafarers, specific forms were found. The first one existed for business partners and married couples. The one for married couples appeared frequently in the Insolvency Chamber collection (see Figure 7) . This standardised text took care of two things. First, the wife relinquished the protected legal position she had in Amsterdam (and elsewhere in the Republic). Lenders who wanted to have recourse to all household possession therefore required married borrowers to use this form. Second, it made sure that the husband could not refer the lender to his wife, and the other way around. They were both fully liable.
５７
The second kind of form concerned deferred payments for goods sold to seafarers (see Figure 8 ). These forms recorded the goods and their value as well as the name of the seafarer's ship, its captain, and its destination. Such information was important because payments would only be due when a seafarer safely returned to the Republic. Since no payments were due when a ship sank the forms were called Brieven op behouden Reyse, or notes on safe arrival.
５８ The borrower attached his person and goods as well as his salary ('maand-gelden') as security for repayment upon his return. Like all other forms, this form was also payable to bearer. The seafarer forms differed from the others in that they were unstamped and two of them were printed on one piece of A4-size paper. This suggests that for smaller loans the combined costs for stamp duty (and litigation) and form were deemed too high. Lenders and borrowers, helped by the booksellers, thus reduced transaction costs by economising on paper and by lending without a stamp. stack of forms in anticipation of business transactions. Thaarup may occasionally have purchased several forms, but it is not unlikely that forms were purchased only once a deal was negotiated or that they already were in the possession of the lender. The latter might be supported by the forms from bookseller Jacobus Vriese that Thaarup signed. Two of those were stamped in 1795 but signed on 12 May 1796, while four were stamped in 1796 and signed on 10, 25, and 30 April. Since Vriese would have sold his old inventory first, it would be much of a coincidence if Thaarup had purchased Vriese's last 1795 forms and his first 1796 forms. This only leaves the possibility that some lenders had forms at hand in anticipation of business opportunities. This is supported by Table 2 , which shows that one-year old forms were quite frequently used. Table 2 also provides evidence of loans that were signed 'before' they were stamped. These most likely represented oral loans that were now recorded in writing. Once a form was purchased the contracting parties had to record the loan details. Figures 3-8 illustrate how this was done. However, on 22 January 1790 Jan Adriaan de Lange (borrower) and Christian van Orsoy (lender) agreed on a redemption scheme a little more elaborate than commonly used. Whereas most redeemed in full when a loan matured, De Lange would repay the first quarter on 8 February 1791 and additional quarters in the subsequent years.
６１
Most borrowers signed with their name, but a mark was sometimes used as well. On 16 August 1792 Dirk Weesing signed himself, but his wife Geertruy Wilthaagen used her mark ('dit is haar merk'). They did the same on 6 February 1793. On another form it was recorded on 18 June 1793 'Dit is t merk van de weduwe Swiering'.
When a form had been completed, interest payments and redemptions were often recorded on it as well. Fourteen annual interest payments of 10 guldens were recorded, for instance, on the 250 gulden loan that Fredrik van Brummelen made to Johannes Heedenrijk in 1792. Jurjan Grutter received three redemptions of 50 guldens on the 400 gulden loan made to Johannis Palick in 1793. Nothing was recorded on Pieter Ebeling's loan to Salomon Mijer (24 April 1780). On the back it was merely recorded, perhaps by the Insolvency Chamber, that ten interest payments had been made.
６２ Jurrian Mijling twice rolled over the 500 guldens he had borrowed for twelve months on 6 February 1781 and, exceptionally, recorded this on the form. ６３ Despite the absence of such notes on most loans, rolling over occurred frequently. Since many loans were signed long before insolvency this should not be interpreted as an inability to pay.
９ Intermediation
The foregoing presumably related to loans on a non-intermediated credit market in which lenders and borrowers were familiar with each other. This 1773) . No collateral or pledges were included in these loans, but the lenders may have felt secure because in all three instances they had recourse to more than one borrower: a married coupled once and two business partners twice.
Further details about this intermediated credit market cannot be established through the three collections analysed in this article. However, the elaborate explanation in Le Moine de l'Espine's merchant manual of how brokers brought together demand for and supply of collateralised loans suggests that the market may have been substantial. This may be confirmed by the fact that, according to Le Moine de l'Espine, such loans were typically recorded on loan forms.
６５ This suggests that in pre-industrial
Amsterdam there not only existed a large non-intermediated credit market, but also a large intermediated one. Establishing how large these segments were relative to each other and whether the Amsterdam credit market primarily relied on the market (non-intermediated) or banks (intermediated) is unfortunately not possible.
６６
１０ Conclusion
Three archival collections allowed this article to uncover a large private credit market in early modern Amsterdam. As became clear, however, these sources mostly related to a part of that market which relied on networks for bringing together demand and supply and where loans were recorded on (un)stamped loan forms. Orally recorded loans, (un)stamped handwritten loan contracts, and intermediated credit thus remained understudied and warrant more research. Necessary too is a deeper insight into the mechanisms guiding the choice of contract -Simon Bevel used various options alongside each other, after all -and the channel through which credit was obtained. Yet, even despite these caveats, De Vries and Van der Woude's hoarding hypothesis is hard to reconcile with what clearly was an active and substantial private credit market. More importantly perhaps than the size of Amsterdam's private credit market was the fact that a large part of the population could participate in this market. The diversity of form types allowed lenders and borrowers in all segments of society to shape their transactions in satisfactory ways. This also meant, for instance, that rich people were not restricted to the securities-backed loans discussed by Jonker, but that they could also make their wealth available through loans that were secured in other ways (e.g. on the collateral of merchant goods). The broad use of forms is confirmed by the size of the loan sums, which ranged between as little as 0.35 guldens and as much as 50,000 guldens, as well as the wide range of occupations of borrowers (from ordinary seafarers to a wealthy silk merchant) and lenders (from shopkeepers to rentiers).
The explanation for the success of loan forms is threefold. First, forms were formulated in the proper legal terms. This meant that a score of regular transactions could be cast in appropriate terms without the legal advice of notaries, for instance. While contracting outside notarial offices kept transaction costs low, loan forms were still embedded in the Dutch Republic's legal system. Second, forms were tailored to the needs of lenders and borrowers. Loans could be secured by adding all sorts of collateral, by naming pledges, and by including additional borrowers. These techniques mitigated the lenders' need to spread risks and ration credit and allowed merchants like Simon Bevel to obtain large sums from a single lender. Third, the threshold for using forms was low. Forms were cheap and were sold by well over a hundred bookshops across town. These were not only situated in the city centre, but also in Amsterdam's poorer neighbourhoods.
The Amsterdam case thus shows that pre-industrial credit markets could mobilise a lot of money. Lenders and borrowers presumably capitalised on the familiarity created through the shared membership of churches, guilds, and militias, living in the same neighbourhood, by doing business with each other, or simply by being friends or belonging to the same family. Where these networks did not suffice, moreover, brokers stood ready to match lenders and borrowers. The credit market that this sustained in the Dutch Republic (and the Kingdom of The Netherlands afterwards), together with the common use of securities-backed loans there, may be part of the explanation for why banks only emerged once industry truly became capital intensive. As long as networks and non-bank intermediaries provided cheap and easy access to secure loans, the market was too thin for banks to emerge. The Amsterdam case therefore shows that financial markets should not be assessed by the presence or absence of banks, but rather by what they could accomplish.
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